T umours are heterogeneous, evolving ecosystems 1,2 , comprising subpopulations of neoplastic cells that follow distinct strategies for survival and propagation 3 . The success of a strategy employed by any single neoplastic subpopulation is dependent on the distribution of other strategies, and on various components of the tumour microenvironment, such as cancer-associated fibroblasts (CAFs) 4 . The echinoderm microtubule-associated protein-like 4-anaplastic lymphoma kinase (ALK) fusion-found in approximately 5% of non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC) patientsleads to constitutive activation of oncogenic tyrosine kinase activity of ALK, thereby 'driving' the disease. Inhibitors of tyrosine kinase activity of ALK (ALK TKIs) have proven to be highly clinically efficacious, inducing tumour regression and prolonging patient survival 5, 6 . Unfortunately, virtually all of the tumours that respond to ALK TKIs eventually relapse 7 -an outcome typical of inhibitors of other oncogenic tyrosine kinases 8 . Resistance to ALK TKI, as with most targeted therapies, remains a major unresolved clinical challenge. Despite significant advances in deciphering the resultant molecular mechanisms of resistance 9 , the evolutionary dynamics of ALK TKI resistance remains poorly understood. The inability of TKI therapies to completely eliminate tumour cells has been shown to be at least partially attributable to protection by aspects of the tumour microenvironment 10 . CAFs are one of the main nonmalignant components of the tumour microenvironment, and the interplay between them and tumour cells is a major contributor to microenvironmental resistance, including cytokine-mediated protection against ALK inhibitors 11 .
To study the eco-evolutionary dynamics of these various factors, we interrogated the competition between treatment-naïve cells of the ALK mutant NSCLC cell line H3122 (a 'workhorse' for studies of ALK-positive lung cancer) and a derivative cell line in which we developed resistance to alectinib (a highly effective clinical ALK TKI 12 ) by selection in progressively increasing concentrations of the drug 13 . We aimed to come to a quantitative understanding of how these dynamics were affected by clinically relevant concentrations of alectinib (0.5 μM; see ref. 14 ) in the presence or absence of CAFs isolated from a lung cancer. To achieve this, we developed an assay for quantifying effective games 15, 16 that is of independent interest to the general study of microscopic systems.
Results
Monotypic versus mixed cultures. To establish baseline characteristics, we performed assays in monotypic cultures of parental (alectinib-sensitive) and resistant cell lines with and without alectinib and CAFs. To gather temporally resolved data for inferring growth rates, we used time-lapse microscopy to follow the expansion of therapy-resistant and parental cells, differentially labelled with stable expression of selectively neutral green fluorescent protein (GFP) and mCherry fluorescent proteins, respectively. From the time-series data, we inferred the growth rate with confidence intervals for each of 6 experimental replicates in 4 different experimental conditions (for a total of 24 data points, each with confidence intervals), as seen in Fig. 1 . As expected, alectinib inhibited growth rates of parental cells (dimethyl sulfoxide (DMSO) versus alectinib: P < 0.005; DMSO + CAF versus alectinib + CAF: P < 0.005), whereas the growth rate of the resistant cells was not affected. In addition, as previously reported 11 , CAFs partially rescued growth inhibition of parental cells by alectinib (alectinib versus alectinib + CAF: P < 0.005; alectinib + CAF versus DMSO: P < 0.005), without impacting growth rates of resistant cells. However, we did not limit ourselves to monotypic assays. Our experience observing non-cell-autonomous biological interactions 17 and modelling eco-evolutionary interactions [18] [19] [20] in cancer led us to suspect that the heterotypic growth rates would differ from monotypic culture. Cell-autonomous fitness effects are those where the benefits and costs to growth rate are inherent to the cell: the presence of other cells is an irrelevant feature of the microenvironment, and the growth rates from monotypic cultures provide all of Fibroblasts and alectinib switch the evolutionary games played by non-small cell lung cancer Artem Kaznatcheev 1,2 *, Jeffrey Peacock 3 , David Basanta 4 , Andriy Marusyk 5 * and Jacob G. Scott 2,6 * Heterogeneity in strategies for survival and proliferation among the cells that constitute a tumour is a driving force behind the evolution of resistance to cancer therapy. The rules mapping the tumour's strategy distribution to the fitness of individual strategies can be represented as an evolutionary game. We develop a game assay to measure effective evolutionary games in co-cultures of non-small cell lung cancer cells that are sensitive and resistant to the anaplastic lymphoma kinase inhibitor alectinib. The games are not only quantitatively different between different environments, but targeted therapy and cancerassociated fibroblasts qualitatively switch the type of game being played by the in vitro population from Leader to Deadlock. This observation provides empirical confirmation of a central theoretical postulate of evolutionary game theory in oncology: we can treat not only the player, but also the game. Although we concentrate on measuring games played by cancer cells, the measurement methodology we develop can be used to advance the study of games in other microscopic systems by providing a quantitative description of non-cell-autonomous effects.
the necessary information. Non-cell-autonomous effects 17 allow fitness to depend on a cell's microenvironmental context, including the frequency of other cell types: growth rates need to be measured in competitive fitness assays over a range of seeding frequencies.
Other microscopic experimental systems in which frequencydependent fitness effects have been considered include, but are not limited to: Escherichia coli 21, 22 , yeast 23, 24 , bacterial symbionts of hydra 25 , breast cancer 17 and pancreatic cancer 26 . Hence, we continued our experiments over a range of initial proportions of resistant and parental cells in mixed cultures for each of the four experimental conditions. Figure 2 shows the resulting growth rates of each cell type in the co-culture experiments for all experimental (colour and shape) and initial conditions (opacity is the parental cell proportion). In the heterotypic culture-unlike monotypic-CAFs slightly improved the growth rates of the parental cells, even in DMSO. More strikingly, even in the absence of drug, resistant cells tend to have a higher growth rate than parental cells in the same environment (that is proportion of parental cells in the co-culture). This is evident from most DMSO points being above the dotted diagonal line (y = x) corresponding to equal growth rate of the two types (this is quantified in Fig. 4b and is further discussed in the section 'Leader and Deadlock games in NSCLC').
Frequency dependence in fitness functions.
Although not common in cancer biology, competitive fitness assays are a gold standard for studying bacteria. They are typically conducted with a single initial ratio of the two competing cell types. However, in Fig. 2 , if we view the initial proportion of parental to resistant cells as a variable parameter represented by opacity, we can see a hint of frequency dependence in both parental and resistant growth rates. This is shown more clearly as a plot of fitness versus the proportion of parental cells in Fig. 3 . In all four conditions, we see that the growth rate of the resistant and parental cell lines depends on the initial proportion of parental cells. To capture the principle first-order part of this dependence, we consider a line of best fit between the initial proportion of parental cells and the growth rates. See equations (1)- (8) in Supplementary Section C (or the matrix entries in Fig. 4b ) for these lines of best fit. Interpretable versions of these lines of best fit (see Supplementary Section D) can be expressed as a regularized fitness function w S C , where S ∈ {P, R} indexes the parental or resistant strategy, and C ∈ {DMSO, DMSO + CAF, alectinib, alectinib + CAF} indexes the experimental condition. For a description of regularization, see Supplementary Section D. Finally, for a discussion of higher-order fitness functions, see Supplementary Section F.
In three of the conditions, resistant cell growth rates increase with an increased seeding proportion of parental cells, while parental growth rates remain relatively constant (in the case of no CAFs) or slightly increase (for alectinib + CAFs). In DMSO, this suggests that parental cells' fitness is independent of resistant cells:
= . w 0 025 P DMSO . Parental fitness in DMSO could be well characterized as cell autonomous. However, resistant cells in monotypic culture have approximately the same fitness as parental cells ( Fig. 2a ), but they benefit from the parental cells in co-culture:
(where p is the proportion of parental cells). Their fitness has a noncell-autonomous component. The positive coefficient in front of p suggests commensalism between resistant and parental cells (that is, resistant cells benefit from the interaction with the parental cells, without exerting positive or negative impact on them).
The DMSO + CAF case differs from the other three in that we see a constant-although elevated ( = . . This could be interpreted as CAFs switching the direction of commensalism between parental and resistant cells.
Leader and Deadlock games in NSCLC. The tools of evolutionary game theory (EGT) are well suited for making sense of frequencydependent fitness [18] [19] [20] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] . In EGT, a game is the rule mapping the population's strategy distribution to the fitness of individual strategies. Previous work has considered games such as snowdrift 24 , stag hunt 25 , rock-paper-scissors 21 and public goods 23,26 alongside experiments. Instead, we experimentally operationalize the effective game (see refs. 15, 16 ) as an assayable hidden variable of a population and its environment. We define the effective game as the game played by an idealized population that shows the same frequency dynamics as the experimental population under consideration. As such, we are not aiming to test EGT as an explanation. Instead, we are defining a game assay to quantitatively describe our system in the language of EGT. In future work, it would be interesting to ask about the best language for describing cancer evolution by testing the game assay against several clearly and well-operationalized alternatives to EGT.
To measure the effective game that describes the non-cellautonomous interactions in NSCLC, we focus on the gain function (see refs. 20, 31 for a theoretical perspective): the difference in growth rate between resistant and parental cells as a function of the proportion of parental cells. The relatively good fit of a linear dependence of growth rates on the parental seeding proportion allows us to describe the interaction as a matrix game-a well-studied class of evolutionary games (see a description in Fig. 4a ). Note that this linearity is not guaranteed to be a good description for arbitrary experimental systems. For example, the game between the two Betaproteobacteria Curvibacter species AEP1.3 and Duganella species C1.2 was described by a quadratic gain function 25 . If one views our work from the perspective of model selection, in the main text we proceed from the assumption of linearity. Supplementary Section F relaxes this assumption, extends our game assay to nonlinear games and compares linear and nonlinear models with information criteria. Our qualitative results are unchanged, although the exact quantitative results for nonlinear models differ slightly. Two strategy matrix games have a convenient representation in a two-dimensional game space (see the model in Fig. 4a and Supplementary Section C for details). This is the output of our game assay. We plot the inferred games in a game space spanned by the theoretical fitness advantage a single resistant invader would have if introduced into a parental monotypic culture versus the fitness advantage of a parental invader in a resistant monotypic culture (as shown in Fig. 4b ). In this representation, there are four qualitatively different types of games corresponding to the four quadrants, each of which we illustrate with a dynamic flow. We can see that the game corresponding to DMSO + CAF-although quantitatively similar to DMSO-is of a qualitatively different type compared with all three of the other combinations.
We can also convert our inferred fitness functions from Fig. 3 into a payoff matrix. We do this by having each row correspond to a strategy's fitness function with the column entries as the p = 1 and p = 0 intercepts of this line of best fit. These payoff matrix entries are abstract phenomenological quantities that could be implemented by various biological or physical processes 15 . If we look at our empirical measurements for DMSO + CAF (upper-right quadrant of Fig. 4b) , we see the Leader game, whereas we see Deadlock in the other three cases (we will use DMSO to illustrate the Deadlock game). The Deadlock game observed in DMSO is in some ways the opposite of the popular Prisoner's Dilemma game (in fact, this is called the anti-Prisoner's Dilemma in ref. 32 ). If we interpret parental as cooperate and resistant as defect, similar to the Prisoner's Dilemma, each player wants to defect regardless of what the other player does (because 4.0 > 2.5 and 2.7 > 2.4; payoff numbers used in these examples are from the matrix entries we measured in Fig. 4 ), but hopes that the other player will cooperate (because 4.0 > 2.7). However, unlike in the Prisoner's Dilemma, mutual cooperation does not Pareto dominate mutual defection (because 2.5 < 2.7), but is instead strictly dominated by it. Thus, the players are locked into defection. In our system, this corresponds to resistant cells having an advantage over parental cells in DMSO.
The Leader game observed in DMSO + CAF is one of four archetypal 2 × 2 games in ref. 33 , and a social dilemma related to the popular game known as Hawk-dove, Chicken or Snowdrift (in fact, this is called the Benevolent Chicken in ref. 32 ). If we interpret parental as 'lead' (for Snowdrift: wait) and resistant as 'work' (for Snowdrift: shovel), similar to Snowdrift, mutual work is better than both leading (because 3.0 > 2.6) and thus no work being done (for Snowdrift: both waiting and thus not getting out of the snowdrift), but each player would want to lead while the other works (because 3.5 > 3.0). However, unlike Snowdrift, mutual work is not better than the 'sucker's payoff ' of working while the other player leads (because 3.1 > 3.0). In ref. 33 , this is seen as a tension with a player switching from a 'natural' point of mutual work to lead and thus benefit both players (3.5 > 3.0; 3.1 > 3.0), but if the second player also does the same and becomes a leader, all benefit disappears (because 2.6 is the smallest payoff). In our system, this corresponds to cells in the tumour experiencing selective pressure to lose some but not all of their resistance in DMSO + CAF.
Note that the above intuitive stories are meant as heuristics, and the effective games that we measure are summaries of population-level properties 15, 16 : the population is the player and the two types of cancer cells are the strategies. This means that the matrix entries should not be interpreted as direct interactions between cells, but as general couplings between subpopulations corresponding to different strategies. The coupling term includes not only direct interactions, but also indirect effects due to spatial structure, diffusible goods, contact inhibition and so on. However, this does not mean that an effective game is not interpretable. For example, the Deadlock game captures the phenomenon of the resistant population always being fitter than the parental population (for example, in DMSO). We noted this effect intuitively in Fig. 2 (also see the section 'Cost of resistance') from replicates being above the y = x diagonal. Measuring a Deadlock game for DMSO with confidence intervals that do not extend outside the bottom-right quadrant of the game space in Fig. 4b allows us to show the statistical significance of our previous intuitive understanding. In other words, effective games allow us to quantify frequency-dependent differences in growth rates.
Discussion
Cost of resistance. The classic model of resistance posits that the resistant phenotype receives a benefit in drug (in our case: alectinib or alectinib + CAF) but is neutral, or even carries an inherent cost, in the absence of treatment (DMSO or DMSO + CAF). For example, experimentalists frequently regard resistance-granting mutations as selectively neutral in the absence of drugs, and the modelling community often goes further by considering explicit costs such as upregulating drug efflux pumps, investing in other defensive strategies or lowering the growth rate by switching to suboptimal growth pathways 3, 34 . If we limited ourselves to the monotypic assays of Fig. 1 , our observations would be consistent with this classic model of resistance. However, in co-culture, we observed that resistant cells have higher fitness than parental cells in the same environment, even in the absence of a drug. This is not consistent with the classic model of resistance. This higher fitness of resistant cells might not surprise clinicians as much as biologists: in clinical experience, tumours that have acquired resistance are often more aggressive than before they were treated, even in the absence of drugs.
See Supplementary Section A.3 for a contrast of the biologist's and clinician's view of resistance in this context.
Treating the game. Measuring a linear gain function has enabled us to develop an assay that represents the interdependence between parental and resistant cells as a matrix game. Experimentally cataloguing these games allows us to support existing theoretical work in mathematical oncology that considers treatment (or other environmental differences) as changes between qualitatively different game regimes [18] [19] [20] 30 . In this framework, treatment has the goal Each plot shows the growth rate with confidence intervals versus the initial proportion of parental cells. These data were measured in the same way as in Fig. 2 . Growth rates of parental and resistant cells are shown as cyan and magenta data points, respectively. Dashed lines represent the linear fitness function of the least-squares best fit; the fit error is visualized in Fig. 4b . The black dot-dashed line is the gain function for parental cells (see Fig. 4a ). It is well below the y = 0 line in the alectinib conditions (indicating the strong advantage of resistance) and thus cut out of the figure. See Supplementary Section C for more discussion and equations for lines of best fit, and Supplementary Section F for alternative fits with nonlinear fitness functions.
not to directly target cells in the tumour, but instead to perturb the parameters of the game they are playing to allow evolution to steer the tumour towards a more desirable result (for example, see refs. [18] [19] [20] 30, 35, 36 ). Empirically, this principle has inspired or built support for interventions, such as buffer therapy 37 , vascular renormalization therapy 38 and adaptive therapy 39 , that target the microenvironment and interactions instead of just attacking the cancer cell population. The success of the trial in ref. 39 suggests that therapeutic strategies based on modulating competition dynamics are feasible. This highlights the need for a formal experimental method such as our game assay that directly measures the games that cancer plays and tracks whether and how they change due to treatment.
In our system, we can view an untreated tumour as similar to DMSO + CAF, and thus following the Leader game. Treating with alectinib (a move to alectinib + CAF) or eliminating CAFs through a stromal-directed therapy (a move to DMSO) moves the game into the lower-right quadrant of Fig. 4b, and it becomes a Deadlock game. Not only are these games quantitatively different among the four environmental conditions (see Fig. 4b ) but they are also of two qualitatively different types. To our knowledge, neither of the Leader and Deadlock games is considered in the previous EGT literature in oncology. Given that the Deadlock of drug-resistant over drug-sensitive cells is a challenge for classic models of resistance, we would be particularly interested in theoretical models of resistance that produce the Deadlock game. In addition to challenging theorists by adding two new entries to the catalogue of games that cancers play, this switch allows us to show that the theoretical construct of EGT (that treatment can qualitatively change the type of game) has a direct experimental implementation. Unfortunately, neither of our in vitro games would lead to a therapeutically desirable outcome if they occurred in a patient.
Heterogeneity and latent resistance.
A particularly important difference between Leader and Deadlock dynamics is the existence of an internal fixed point in Leader but not in Deadlock. Fixed points are a property of equilibrium dynamics: in the most general case, even on very long timescales, these fixed points might not be realized due to the evolutionary constraints of population size 40 or computation 41, 42 . Thus, it is important to check to what extent this qualitative difference can translate to a quantitative difference in finite time horizons. In our system, we can see a quantitative difference in the convergence towards the fixed point in the DMSO + CAF condition of Fig. 4c , and no such convergence in the other three cases (Fig. 4d for alectinib + CAF; Supplementary Fig. 1 ). Since the strength of selection (the magnitude of the gain function) is small near a fixed point, the change in p also slows in the DMSO + CAF condition. We Supplementary Fig. 1 for proportion dynamics of all four games and Supplementary Fig. 2 for density dynamics and their correspondence to the exponential growth model from Fig. 4a .
provide a more robust analysis of this in Supplementary Sections C and F. It would be of interest for future work to study the long-term experimental stability of these fixed points.
Since the DMSO + CAF condition is our closest to an untreated patient, it might have important consequences for latent resistance. Many classical models of resistance assume a rare pre-existent mutant taking over the population after the introduction of a drug. However, in our experimental system, if the resistant strategy is pre-existent, negative frequency-dependent selection will push the population towards a stable polyclonal tumour of resistant and sensitive cells before the introduction of a drug. This allows for much higher levels of pre-existing heterogeneity in resistance than predicted by the classical picture. As such, we urge theorists to reconsider the assumption of the rare pre-existing resistant clone.
Of course, our results are for a single in vitro system. However, if similar games occur in vivo and/or for other cancers, such preexisting heterogeneity could be a possible evolutionary mechanism behind the speed and robustness of treatment resistance to targeted therapies in patients. This could help explain the ubiquity and speed of resistance that undermines our abilities to cure patients or control their disease in the long term. We will not know this unless we set out to quantify the non-cell-autonomous processes in cancer. Building a catalogue of the games cancers play-by adopting our game assay in other cancers, and other experimental contexts-can help resolve this and other questions.
Methods
Cell lines. The H3122 cell line was obtained from E. Haura (Moffitt Cancer Center). Cell line identity was validated by the Moffitt Cancer Center Molecular Genetics core facility using short tandem repeats analysis. Primary lung CAFs were obtained from the laboratory of S. Antonia (Moffitt Cancer Center), following the protocols approved by the University of South Florida Institutional Review Board. CAFs were isolated as described previously 43 and expanded for 3-10 passages before the experiments. The alectinib-resistant derivative cell line was obtained through escalating inhibitor concentration protocol, as described previously 13 . Alectinib-sensitive parental H3122 cells were cultured in DMSO for the same length of time as the alectinib-resistant derivate.
Stable GFP-and mCherry-expressing derivative cell H3122 cell lines were obtained, respectively, through lentiviral transduction with pLVX-AcGFP (Clontech) and mCherry vectors (obtained from K. Mitsiades at the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute). We cultured both H3122 cells and CAFs in Roswell Park Memorial Institute (RPMI) media (Gibco; Thermo Fisher Scientific), supplemented with 10% foetal bovine serum (Serum Source). Regular tests for Mycoplasma contamination were performed with a MycoScope PCR based kit (Genlantis).
Experimental set-up. The cells were harvested on reaching 70% confluence and counted using a Countess II automatic cell counter (Invitrogen). CAFs were counted manually to avoid segmentation artefacts. Mixtures of parental and resistant H3122 cells were prepared at 8 different ratios: all resistant, resistantto-parental ratios of 9:1, 4:1, 3:2, 2:3, 1:4 and 1:9, and all parental. For the determination of competitive growth rates, 2,000 H3122 cells from the 8 mixtures were seeded with or without 500 CAF cells in 50 μl RPMI media per well into 384-well plates (Corning; catalogue number 7200655), with different ratios of differentially labelled parental and alectinib-resistant variants (6 wells were used for each resistant-to-parental ratio in each of the 4 conditions). Then, 20 h after seeding, alectinib (ChemieTek) or DMSO vehicle control, diluted in 20 μl RPMI, was added to each well, to achieve a final alectinib concentration of 500 nM l −1 (ref. 14 ) . Time-lapse microscopy measurements were performed every 4 h in phase-contrast white light, as well as green and red fluorescent channels using an IncuCyte ZOOM system (Essen BioScience).
Game assay. We used the exponential growth rate in the fluorescent area of the two fluorescent channels as our measure of fitness. To minimize the impact of growth inhibition by confluency, we analysed the competitive dynamics during the first 5 d of culture, when the cell population was expanding exponentially. We learned the growth rate, along with a confidence interval, from the time series of the population size in each well using the Theil-Sen estimator. More details on, and justification of, this measure of fitness are available in Supplementary Section B.2.
Since raw population sizes have different units (GFP fluorescent area (GFA) versus mCherry fluorescent area (RFA)), we converted them to common cell-number units (CNU) by learning the linear transform that scales GFA and RFA into CNU. We defined proportions based on this common CNU as p = N P / (N P + N R ), where N {P,R} is the CNU size of parental and resistant populations.
The transform of GFA to RFA into CNU is associated with an error that is propagated to measures of p as σ p .
To measure the fitness functions, we plotted the fitness of each cell type in each well versus the seeding proportion (p) of parental cells in Fig. 3 . The x axis proportion of parental cells (p) was computed from the first time point. We estimated the line of best fit and error on parameters for this data using least squares weighted by the inverse of the error on each data point. For the exact lines of best fit, see Supplementary Section C.3.
The p = 0 and p = 1 intercepts of the lines of best fit serve as the entries of the game matrices. Note that in Fig. 4b , we multiplied the entries by 100 for easier presentation. The game points were calculated from the matrices as x = C − A and y = B − D, and the error was propagated from the error estimates on the parameters of lines of best fit.
Reporting Summary. Further information on research design is available in the Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
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